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n player has to decide a on fair numerical value x. Let's say this value is fair around f. All player write their value on a piece of paper face down. One of these values are selcted at random to be the actual value of x. But some [View full text and thread]
Hi All!
I was wondering if anyone could help me out with a game theory question:
My game involves two opposing players, M and W.
M’s objective is to pay the smallest amount. W’s objective is to gain the biggest amount.
M [View full text and thread]
Hi, in 1st Semester we have no Game Theory. Nevertheless this subject fascinates me.
My question in solving any matrices (2x2/3x3): As long I do not know, if players play WeakDominance > At 1st: I use [View full text and thread]
Hi Evreryone,
I am strugling to solve the third question of this exam. Can someone help me to solve it?
Basically, when I solve it I only find one NE ( i.e. Lr). This issue is that there are supposed to be many NE. I checked for [View full text and thread]
PLAYERS: A plaintiff and a defendant
THE ORDER OF PLAY:
1. The plaintiff decides whether to bring suit against the defendant at cost c.
2. The plaintiff makes a takeitorleaveit settlement offer of s>0.
3. The defendant accepts [View full text and thread]
I know that for 2x2 games with two strict equilibrium strategies A and B, the riskdominant equilibrium is the one with a higher product of deviation losses (i.e. what each player would lose by not playing the equilibrium if the other [View full text and thread]
I think the answers to both questions are negative. Consider a twoplayer game where two players (1 and 2) choose the numbers x_1, x_2 from the set [0,2], and the payoff of each player is given by u_i(x_1,x_2)=x_i+(x_1x_2)^2. Then [View full text and thread]
Do we know that each nash equlibrium strategy in such a game is symmetric, too? [View full text and thread]
Hi,
is there some theorem stating, that in every continuous game with symmetric players every nash equlibrium will yield the same utility to all players?
Or something like this for special cases?
The theorem seems quite natural to [View full text and thread]
Pakistani wedding dresses [View full text and thread]
Septum piercing pain, dangers and jewelry. [View full text and thread]
Landscaping ideas for front of house are easy to come by, but none of these ideas is actually helpful if you cannot apply them in your home. Let's see how we cam make use of these ideas in a more natural, modern way.
15 Landscaping [View full text and thread]
You must carry out each exercise at a degree where it feels a fewwhat tough and where you feel fatigued on the last repetition of each set. [View full text and thread]
Dear all,
Suppose I have a game in extensive form as follows. Player 1 moves first and chooses R, M or L. If he chooses R, the game ends. Otherwise, the game reaches a nontrivial inform[ation set of player 2. At this information [View full text and thread]
How does one handle nonpareto Nash Equilibria in recursive games.
Using gametree approaches, I am dealing with the situation when
at each move, the two players issue their moves simultaneously. Of course,
one can get several [View full text and thread]
Consider a game where two players (1,2) chooses between two strategies (A,B). The payoff vectors are: p(A,A)=(1,0), p(B,B)=(0,0), p(A,B)=(2,2), p(B,A)=(2,2).
There are clearly 2 Nash equilibria ((A,B) and (B,A)), but intuitively, only [View full text and thread]
Hello! Newbie here with a quick one for ya..
In Yahtzee (or similar dice game), if a player rolls 6,6,6,5,5 *EARLY in the game*, is it optimal to play 3ofakind for 28, or fullhouse for 25?
Ultimately, the simple objective is to [View full text and thread]
Hello,
I am a graduate student writing a paper using game theory. I have attached the normal form game, but am not sure how to interpret the equilibrium. This game player 1 moves first and players 2 and 3 are simultaneous after p1 [View full text and thread]
