Zero Sum Games
Please help me about this question! [View full text and thread]
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Can anyone suggest me any free paper about allocation of tradable permits for pollution through auctions? How could i develop the problem of 2 firms participating to a second price sealed auction and then deciding their optimal [View full text and thread]
my apologies if my problem is a no-brainer, I am very new to auction theory and appreciate any pointers in the right directions e.g. in the scientific literature.
I am looking for an appropriate auction model where a sold good [View full text and thread]
hi I found some challenging questions...
Consider the double auction with one seller and one buyer (Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983)). The valuations vs and vb of the seller and the buyer are
independently drawn from the uniform [View full text and thread]
Consider the following two-person, "sealed bid" auction. There is $10 up for auction. Suppose the bids are $1.25 and $11. Is this strategy profile a Nash Equilibrium of the game? [View full text and thread]
I am interested in determining how value should be calculated in a snake draft. For example, there are 4 drafters (A,B,C, and D). Each must select 2 elements from each of 5 categories (Z,Y,X,W,V) in a snake draft order [View full text and thread]
how would you compute an equilibrium for an all-pay auction with two bidders, where if x1 and x2 are the two bids, the probability of winning is xi/(x1+x2)? it looks like there is no pure strategy equilibrium, but then i'm not sure how [View full text and thread]
If each person’s private valuation is common knowledge, then in the equilibrium all the persons with valuation greater than v101 will arrive simultaneously at the waiting line at the time that waiting cost is equal to v101. All others [View full text and thread]
Double auction is a type of auctions in which both sellers and buyers submit bids which are then ranked highest to lowest to generate demand and supply profiles. From the profiles, the [View full text and thread]
In a mutli-unit double auction, how is NE related to CE? Could the NE be reachable by a dynamic process? Thanks. [View full text and thread]
I am looking for an expert who is experienced in assisting bidders in developing a bidding strategy for use in electromagnetic spectrum license auctions in the telecoms industry. Who could help us in this?
Pls send a CV to [View full text and thread]
Can Game Theory determine the optimal auction rules that will extract the highest surplus from buyers?
Any help on this question would be appreciated. [View full text and thread]
Can someone tell me where can I find a characterization of equilibria in a sealed bid double auction game but with only two types of buyer and two types of seller (high valuation and low valuation)? Is there a name for such games? [View full text and thread]
whats the equlibrium for 80/90/100 values 3rd price auction ? [View full text and thread]
I'm new in this field, I'm looking for books, paper, resoucce in internet,... and I'm open to any informations that can help me to have some existing models.
Thank you for your help, [View full text and thread]
|Respond to the question: I need some reference about auction game?|
11/18/2004 02:23 AM by Badis; I need some reference about auction game model
Recently I am reasching a problem that a seller have some identical goods to sell by the way of auction and some bidders which have more than one unit demands want to bid the goods.How to analyze the auction? Thanks! [View full text and thread]
I should have added that the auction is likely to be English - open bidding [View full text and thread]
for a research project, I'm looking for informations about Fur Auction Theory (like papers, rules, theory... news). If you have any idea, thank you to let me know.
Matthias [View full text and thread]
I need to make a comparison between several kinds of auctions.
I need to get DATA of first and second bid auctions and also dutch and english auctions. [View full text and thread]
I am looking for references to a second price double auction in the game theory literature
[View full text and thread]
When modelling standard auctions, private information of bidders (that is basically about their valuations - of course, their valuations can also be private or interdependent) can be modelled as either independent or [View full text and thread]
payoff function is probability of your bid being higher (not equal: P[Y=x]=0) times (v-p). Uniform distribution on [0,1] gives us P[Y [View full text and thread]
I am looking for someone knowledgeable about the earliest uses of electronic auctions. I have a particular interest in an extendable closing time (to prevent sniping). Any/All help appreciated. I would really appreciate if you also [View full text and thread]
Hi, I am a computer programmer with little knowledge of economics but strong in math. I'm working on devising algorithms to solve games. I need to look at solutions to the unsolved exercises in Game Theory & microeconomics books by [View full text and thread]
What do you mean by "knwown market value"? If you have common value case in your mind, then the bidding function is different from that in independent private value case. You can drive symmetric linear bidding schedules(bi=a*si+b*sj) [View full text and thread]
You can check Game theory by Fudenberg and Tirole and references therein. [View full text and thread]
If you mean by risk netral nash equilibrium a nash equilibrium of the game where bidders are risk netral, then you can llok at the book "The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information" by Hirshleifer and Riley(pp.386-390). And you can [View full text and thread]
What is the optimum strategy for governments when (1) auctioning out certain functions i.e., tax collection, where the HIGHEST bid is sucessful; and (2) inviting bids for provision of services or materials, where the LOWEST bid is [View full text and thread]
I am looking for basic literature that derives the risk neutral Nash equilibrium bid function in first-price seald-bid auctions. [View full text and thread]
Hi, I am working for an investment management company in LA. When we rebalance our various accounts each month, we contact same 5 brokers to get their bids for executing trades of our portfolios. At the end of each auction, we don't [View full text and thread]
What you ask seems how you can get symetric equilibrium budding function in the first-price sealed bud auction, where each individual's value of goods is drawn from uniform distribution. You can consult any textbook on game theory. [View full text and thread]
I was given the following question for homework, and I'm having some trouble with it.
Consider a first price, sealed bid auction. There are two bidders, 1 and 2. Bidder i values the good at v(i). If she pays p for the good then the [View full text and thread]
In Porter and Hendricks' paper on Collusion in Auctions (Annales d'economie et de statistique) there is a reference to signal jamming in repeated IPV auctions as an explanation for players shading their bids below their valuations. [View full text and thread]
Hi Qing Ding,
you may find paper about auction in this web site:
cheers [View full text and thread]
Can exist a Nash equilibria, in 3rd price auctions, when every bidder choose the same price ? ( assume that the biders are at least 3 ) If yes, which price ? [View full text and thread]
I think he's talking about the model of some online retailers, such as www.mobshop.com. With more buyer participate, the price will drop according to some rule. So for a buyer, he has to determine when to come in and for a seller, he [View full text and thread]
There is an idea related to this: an English auction is the familiar auction where the bidders submit increasing bids, until no one will bid higher. An alternative is a sealed bid second auction: everyone submits a sealed bid, the [View full text and thread]
Can you clearify some of the confusion in your description of the issue? I put my question in the <> in your original text.
The issue involves a series of transactions that are [View full text and thread]
In the auction literature that I know of, time saving is not a major concern becasue the model usually assume discount rate equals one. In such kind of setting, the scheme you have propose does not change any thing, i.e. the buyers will [View full text and thread]
Unfortunately I am not aware of papers analyzing auction like situations
with network effects. On the latter I can mention Katz and Shapiro
seminal papers in the eighties.
[View full text and thread]
The central issue is how bidding is affected if one of the bidders is allowed to match rather
than bid himself. Numerical methods might be needed in general, but there is one special
case which is easy to analyse.
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